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Abstract 
 
We propose a model of growth with human capital accumulation, in which individuals 
allocate their time among work, education and socio-political participation. There are 
two groups, women and men, whose values and targets are different; every individual 
engages in socio-political activities to socially establish the values of the group she/he 
belongs to; his utility will be greater the more the society has values similar to those of 
the belonging group. How participation in socio-political activities affects individual’s 
utility depends on the relative presence of the individual’s social group in employment. 
The model predicts that economies with a more equal presence of females and males in 
employment and higher population growth rates converge to a stationary state where 
time allocated to working activities is lower and time for education is higher. We 
simulate the model on some European countries with different male/female employment 
rates, population growth rates and capital shares. Simulations confirm the empirical 
evidence: European countries with a more equal presence of women and men in the 
labour market experience higher education attainment rates, allocate a higher proportion 
of time to social participation, and work, on average, a lower number of hours than 
countries with a lower relative proportion of females in employment. 
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1. Introduction 
In this article we propose a model of growth with endogenous determination of time 
allocated to education, work, and socio-political activity, in which society is composed by 
two social groups, women and men, pursuing different social values. In this context, 
individual’s utility depends also on the extent the society represents the values of the social 
group s/he belongs; values can be affirmed by participating in socio-political activities and 
depending on the relative weight of the reference group in society. The main objective of 
our contribution is to provide a theoretic framework to explain the relationship observed in 
developed countries, in particular in those belonging to the European Union, among 
relative presence of women in society, average time allocated to either education, work or 
socio-political activities and per capita income. 
 
The empirical evidence shows that European countries are characterised by a negative 
relationship between female labour market presence relative to men and average time 
devoted to work; moreover, countries with the highest proportion of active females on 
working population perform also the highest levels of education attainment and per-capita 
income. On the other hand, we observe a positive relationship between time allocated to 
socio-political activities and proportion of women in the labour force. Therefore, countries 
with the highest levels of per-capita incomes record also the highest participation in 
politics and social activities, as proved in the pioneering studies of Lane (1966), Frey 
(1971) and Russell (1972). 
An interesting fact emerges if we examine European countries as to the relationship 
between total employment by sex, fertility rates and growth rates of population. We find 
that countries with a more equal distribution of employment between males and females, 
are accompanied by higher fertility rates, growth rates of population and education 
attainment (virtuous countries). We may say that in the European Union there exist two 
different social models: a Nordic model where the proportion between female and male 
employment is practically equal; in addition to that, fertility and population growth rates 
are among the highest and working time is the lowest in Europe; a Mediterranean model 
where, on the contrary, the proportion of females in total employment is strongly lower 
than the proportion of men, working time is higher and average educational levels are 
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lower than in “virtuous” countries. In between the two social models we find the 
continental model.  
 
Our model presents a theoretical framework to determine the degree of individuals’ socio-
political commitment, without assuming, however, that socio-political activity implies 
subtracting time from working activity, as suggested in other recent contributions (Antoci 
et al., 2007). Our agents choose how much of the available time to devote to education, 
work and socio-political activities, knowing that education allows to improve hourly 
productivity, while socio-political participation consents to take part in the determination 
of society’s values, and to obtain a greater benefit the more the society’s values are similar 
to those of the group the agent belongs to1.  
We assume that society is composed by two groups, precisely women and men, interested 
in different values; the largest is any group, the higher is the utility of individuals 
belonging to that group. Therefore, how participation in socio-political activities affects 
individual’s utility depends on the relative incidence of the individual’s social group 
−either men or women− in the whole society, e.g. on the relative size of the group.  
Our assumption, that women and men constitute social groups opposed to each other, goes 
back to Hofstede (2001) and the idea that masculinity and femininity can be traits 
identifying different social roles. Referring to Hofstede’s contribution, masculinity is seen 
to be the trait which emphasizes ambition, acquisition of wealth, and differentiated gender 
roles; femininity is seen to be the trait which stresses in general more fluid roles, caring 
and nurturing behaviours2. On the other hand, the recent economic literature applying the 
experimental approach shows the existence of robust gender differences in risk 
preferences, social preferences and competitive preferences3.  
In our framework, the coexistence of different social groups can have economic 
consequences (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). Society is characterised by the traits of the 
predominant social group. Where women and men are not equally represented in the 
                                                          
1 We assume that the representative agent shares completely the values of the group he belongs. 
2 In his categorization of countries, Hofstede (2001, p. 297) distinguishes between “feminine” and 
“masculine” countries. The former are societies in which social gender roles are clearly distinct: men are 
supposed to be assertive, and focused on material success; women are supposed to be more modest and 
concerned with the quality of life. The latter are countries in which social gender roles overlap and men have 
values similar to those of women. Hofstede reveals that women in feminine countries have the same modest, 
caring values as the men; in the masculine countries they are somewhat assertive and competitive, but not so 
much as the men, so that these countries show a gap between men’s values and women’s values.  
3 See Croson and Gneezy (2009) for a recent survey. 
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economic activity, the society will be dominated by the values of the largest social group. 
We predict that in countries where there is an equal proportion of women and men in 
economic activities, and therefore and equal incidence of feminine and masculine values in 
the society, educational levels are higher, average working hours are lower and socio-
political commitment is greater than in countries where women and men are not equally 
represented.  
Our model predicts correctly the empirical facts discussed previously: on the one hand the 
positive relation among the proportion of female to male workers in the economy 
(exogenous in our model) and average educational levels; on the other, the negative 
relation between the relative presence of females in the labour market and average hours of 
work. Economies where labour activity is equally distributed between men and women, 
are characterized by lower average working hours, higher educational levels and 
participation in socio-political activities than economies in which the relative presence of 
women in economic activities is lower. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses some empirical evidence about the 
influence of gender participation on socio-economic variables; Section 3 provides the 
theoretical model; Section 4 presents our simulated results for some European countries; in 
Section 5 we conclude. 
 
 
2. Empirical evidence 
The model we are going to propose in next Section tries to explain the relationship 
between the relative presence of women in the labour market and some factors strictly 
related to countries’ socio-economic performances. In particular, at the theoretical level, 
our framework predicts that a society characterised by an equal gender involvement in 
economic activity can achieve a redistribution of hours of work from men to women 
such that, on average, time spent to work is less than in countries where women are 
underrepresented in the labour market. Moreover, when work is equally distributed 
between genders, people reallocate their time in favour of other activities, such as 
education and socio-political participation.  
Here, we provide a discussion of empirical facts related to the variables determined in 
the model, to give an empirical foundation to our theoretical predictions and a 
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benchmark to discuss the simulated results (next Section). Unfortunately, we do not 
have data for a single country on some of the variables of interest, and we have to resort 
to an inter-country comparison. Although we are aware that this alternative implies to 
compare economies characterised by different labour market structures and policies 
−especially to enhance female employment− and unlike fertility rates, migration flows 
and per-capita incomes, we anyway believe that the comparison can help to validate our 
theoretical approach; as it will be clear later, at least at the European level correlations 
between female-to-male employment ratios and some socio-economic indicators are 
supporting our theoretical predictions and the simulated results. 
 
Our model determines the allocation of time among education, work, and socio-political 
activities. We first look at the relationship between education and relative presence of 
women in employment. In Figure 1, we plot data on the country’s average years of 
school4 versus male-to-female employment ratio5.  
 
Figure 1. Relationship between male-to-female employment ratio and average years of 
school 
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Source: Our elaborations on Eurostat data (male-to-female ratio) and Barro and Lee (2000) 
 
The highest proportion of males to females in employment, in Europe, is observed in 
Southern countries (Greece, Italy and Spain); on the other hand, the most equally 
                                                          
4 Data are from Eurostat (2005). The percentage is calculated on total population aged 25-64. 
5 Barro and Lee (2000). 
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distribution of work between the two sexes is in Scandinavian countries, France, 
Germany, Portugal and some Eastern economies. Surprisingly, the Netherlands does not 
rank the first in equal division of labour (its male-to-female employment ratio is 1.23).  
Apart from a few observations, in Europe there appears to be a clear negative 
relationship between country’s educational levels and female relative participation in 
employment. 
 
As to the relationship between female relative participation in employment and average 
working time, in Figure 2 we observe that countries with a less equal distribution of 
work between genders experience, in general, higher levels of average weekly working 
time.6 Countries with the highest levels of working time (more than 40 hours per week) 
are the new entrants Eastern and Baltic countries, and Greece, the country ranking first 
as to both male-to-female employment ratios and time allocated to work. Scandinavian 
countries plus United Kingdom, France, Portugal and Austria perform an almost equal 
allocation of work between females and males (coefficients are between 1.1 and 1.2) 
and an average commitment in working activities lower than 38 hours per week. 
 
Figure 2. Relationship between male-to-female employment ratio and average weekly 
hours of work 
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Source: Eurostat (2005), LFS  
On a theoretical base, our framework predicts that when a country experiences an 
increasing participation of women in employment relative to men, then also time 
                                                          
6 All data are from Eurostat (2005), LFS. Working time is referred to the main job. 
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allocated to socio-political activities should increase; the more employment is equally 
distributed between genders, the higher the proportion of time, on average, devoted to 
socio-political participation. On the other hand, if we also take into account the 
differences among countries in terms of population growth rates and capital shares, the 
result, on a theoretical base, is uncertain.  
In the following Figure, we show how the relationship between the two variables 
behaves in some countries of the European Union. Unfortunately, the only available 
data on time allocated to socio-political activities have been collected through a special 
survey (Eurostat, European Social Survey-ESS) carried out only in some countries7.  
 
Figure 3. Relationship between male-to-female employment ratio and time allocated to 
socio-political activities 
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Source: Eurostat (2000), LFS and Eurostat: Time Use Survey 
 
Figure 3 clearly illustrates the existence of a negative relationship, at least for the 
European countries included in the ESS, between the proportion of male-to-female 
employment and time spent in socio-political activities. Empirics seem to highlight a 
strong regularity: economies with an almost equal division of market labour between 
men and women (at least in terms of heads), Estonia and Finland, also show a higher 
                                                          
7 Data are available at the web address: http://ess.nsd.uib.no. Data have been collected across the period 
1998-2002 in Belgium, Germany, Estonia, France, Hungary, Slovenia, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom 
and Norway (for a summary of the results:Eurostat, 2005). For Spain, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, 
data were collected across the period 2002-2004 ((for a summary: Eurostat, 2006). From the dataset we 
extrapolate information on time allocated to “volunteer activites” (the dataset containes an explicit entry) 
and “other participatory activities” (subheading of “leasure time”). 
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commitment, in terms of average time, in socio-political activities; on the other hand, 
Italy and Spain rank last in both female relative market employment and participation in 
socio-political activities. Once again, the Scandinavian versus Mediterranean countries’ 
scheme emerges. 
 
An interesting general question economists have been debating for a long time is related 
to whether a country should pursue full employment at the expense of a lower 
individual working time and then a lower level of individual income. Our model 
predicts that, in the long run, economies with a more equal labour market participation 
between men and women achieve, on average, lower per-capita incomes than countries 
where work is mainly a male fact: as the female presence in market activities increases 
and converges to male’s labour market participation, average time allocated to human 
capital accumulation decreases and so does per-capita income. Nonetheless, if we 
consider the existing differences among other parameters, this conclusion can fail to 
comply with evidence.  
 
Figure 4. Relationship between male-to-female employment ratio and per-capita GDP 
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Source:Eurostat (2005), per-capita GDP in PPS (EU-27=100). Eurosat (2005), LFS. 
 
Figure 4 seems to confirm the positive relationship between male relative employment 
and per-capita income. The relationship between the two variables appears positive, 
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even though not exactly linear. As previously observed, countries with the highest male-
to-female employment ratio are Greece, Italy and Spain.  
 
We propose a last focus on the link between per-capita income and commitment in 
socio-political activities, in the wake of pioneering works, from the late 1960 and early 
1970s, showing that countries with the highest levels of per-capita incomes record also the 
highest participation in politics and social activities (Lane, 1966; Frey, 1971; Russell, 
1972). Our model does not predict a clear relationship between the two variables, in an 
inter-country comparison (supposing different capital shares, population growth rates 
and female-to-male employment ratios). 
As to the relationship between the degree of development (per-capita GDP) and socio-
political involvement, Figure 5 shows an uncertain pattern; indeed, the variability of 
time allocated to socio-political activities is rather high in correspondence to a few per-
capita income levels. The limited availability of data on socio-political participation 
does not allow to dare the existence of a positive relationship.  
 
Figure 5. Relationship between per-capita GDP and time allocated to socio-political 
activities* 
10
12
14
16
18
tim
e 
in
 s
oc
io
-p
ol
iti
ca
l a
ct
iv
iti
es
0 50 100 150 200
per capita gdp
 
Source: Eurostat (2000), per-capita gdp in PPS(EU-27=100). Eurostat: Time Use Survey 
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3. The Model 
We consider a competitive, closed economy populated by identical and infinitely lived 
agents. Agents are perfectly rational and the production sector is subject to constant returns 
to scale. Agents belong either to social group f (females) or m (males) and at any time t 
group s (f, m) is made by  tN s  individuals working in the only production sector of the 
economy. Each population  tN s  is determined exogenously as well as n, the growth rate 
of population, which is equal for both groups. 
In each instant, individuals allocate their no leisure time among three different activities: 
acquiring a formal education, )(tes ; working in the productive sector, )(tu s ; and 
participating to socio-political life, )(tp s . The representative individual of group s has 
the following preferences over per-capita consumption, )(tc s , and socio-political 
participation8: 
 
     td)t(pg)t(cloge0V sss
0
t)nρ(s      s = f, m  (1) 
Where 0  is a common discount rate. 
Function )p(g ss  is defined as follows: 
Z
pNpN
pN)p(g ssss
ss
ss
     (2) 
mN  and fN  are the  number of men and women in the labour market. 
Z  is total benefit. 
 
Defining f
m
N
Nβ  , function )p(g ss  becomes: 
Zβpp
p)p(g mf
f
mm
   for women  (3) 
                                                          
8 The utility function of the representative agent of group s depends on the level of consumption and on 
function ))t(p(g ss , which summarises how socio-political participation affects the utility of 
consumption. We suppose that, at any time t, the representative individual of group s has an instantaneous 
utility function   ))t(p(gexp)t(ctU ssss  . Taking the logarithmic transformation, we obtain the 
expression that enters in the overall utility shown in Equation (1).  
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Zβpp
βp)p(g mf
m
mm
   for men  (4) 
Individuals maximize function (1), with respect to sc , sp  and su , subject to the laws of 
motion for k (per-capita capital) and h (per-capita human capital): 
In Equations (2) to (4), Z represents the total benefit the two groups try to capture; the 
higher the proportion of Z any social group is able to capture, the more the values of the 
society correspond to the values characterizing that group. The proportion of Z that any 
social group is able to take depends on a function of the group’s relative weight in the 
society −measured by the number of individuals belonging to that group relative to the 
other group’s size− and on the time that each group’s representative individual devotes 
to social activities. For simplicity, we impose Z equal to one. 
For simplicity of notation, when possible and not confusing, we omit superscript s.  
Individuals maximize the value function (1), with respect to c, p and u, subject to the 
following laws of motion for per-capita capital (Equation 5), and individual human 
capital (Equation 6): 
 
  )()()()()(),()( tctknthtutkftk      (5) 
  )()()()(1)( ththtptuBth       (6) 
 
Initial levels of physical and human capitals, )0(k  and )0(h , are given.  
 
Following Lucas (1988), human capital accumulation depends on the level of human 
capital already attained by our representative agent )(th , and time devoted to education 
))()(1( tptu   multiplied by parameter B, measuring productivity of the education 
sector. Differently from Lucas, we assume that human capital depreciates at the same 
rate of depreciation of physical capital.  
 
The production function is assumed to be a Cobb-Douglas: 
      1)()()()()(),( thtutkthtutkf . 
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The current value Hamiltonian we maximize to solve our model is: 
 
 
 
 
  )]()()()(1)[(
)]()()()()(),()[(
)()(log))(),(),(),(),(),((
2
1
21
ththtptuBt
tctknthtutkft
tpgtctttptutktcH ss






 
 
The FOCs associated to the current value Hamiltonian are 
)()( 1
1 ttc      (7) 
)()(2)( tBhtg tp      (8) 
)()()()( 2)(1 tBhtthft tL       (9) 
)(
1
1
)(
)(
tkft
t 


     (10) 
))()(1()(
)(
)(
2
2 tptuBtBun
t
t 


   (11) 
 
Since )(tu  represents the fraction of time the representative agent devotes to current 
production, )()( thtu  represents the fraction of time devoted to work in terms of 
efficiency units.  
The transversality condition can be written as follows: 
0)]()()()([lim 21
)(  thttkte
tn
t
 .  
Deriving the values of λ1(t) and λ2(t) from (7) and (8) respectively and putting them into 
(9), we obtain  
)(
)(
)(
)(
)()( tc
tk
tk
thfg tLtp     (12) 
Equation (12) describes the relationship among state and control variables at time t and is 
crucial for future analysis.  
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The system of first order conditions is solved by imposing the steady state equilibrium.9 In 
particular, considering that in the stationary state 0
p
p
u
u
h
h
k
k
c
c
2
2
1
1 

  10, 
together with (12), system (7)-(11) becomes 
*kf    (13) 
*Bun     (14) 
*)*1( puB     (15) 
n
k
hukf
k
c  
*
*)**,(
*
*    (16) 
 
As in the standard Lucas model without external effects, equation (14) implies that the 
steady-state equilibrium level of time allocated to work depends positively on the rate of 
intertemporal preference, negatively on the rate of population growth and inversely on 
productivity of the education sector. Moreover, individuals of both groups work, in per-
capita terms, the same number of hours. This result may appear empirically unrealistic; 
however, this is because we do not model the choice between household work and market 
work. The model determines the distribution of time between education, work and socio-
political participation.  
By considering the Cobb-Douglas production technology, the solution to system (12)-(16) 
leads to the following (implicit) reaction functions for sp  (s = f, m): 
For group f: 
)puα)φ(1(1αnρ
)puφ(1ρ
u
α1
pβp
βp
f*
f*
*fm
m

  (17) 
 
For group m:  
)puα)φ(1(1αnρ
)puφ(1ρ
u
α1
pβp
βp
m*
m*
*fm
f

   (18) 
 
                                                          
9 Given λ1(t) and λ2(t), if the current value Hamiltonian function is concave in k(t) and h(t), the Arrow’s 
theorem implies that the FOCs, jointed to the transversality conditions, are necessary and sufficient to 
characterize a maximum solution. 
10 It is easy to demonstrate that this economy does not reach, in the long-run, a balanced growth path, but 
a stationary state where per-capita growth rates are equal to zero. The stationary state is stable. See the 
Appendix for the analysis of stability. 
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The solution to system (17)-(18) is a Nash-Cournot equilibrium in which the fraction of 
time allocated to socio-political participation by both groups depends on the relative 
proportion of the two groups, as well as on the other parameters.  
If the two groups have the same number of members ( 1β ), the two reaction functions 
are drawn as in Figure 6; as the proportion of men in the labour market increases, relative 
to females ( >1), then the reaction functions flat towards the abscissas(Figure 7)11. 
Indeed, given any there exist two possible Nash-Cournot equilibriums; however, as the 
right-hand side of Figure 6 shows, the only reasonable equilibrium, due to time constraint, 
is in correspondence of the lowest allocation of time to socio-political participation. 
 
Figure 6. Steady state equilibrium time allocated to socio-political participation when 
females and males are equally represented in employment (=1) 
 
 
                                                          
11 For realistic values of , the Nash-Cournot equilibrium is stable. 
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Figure 7. Steady state equilibrium time allocated to socio-political participation when 
males exceed females in employment  
 
Note: the plot is for  2.  
 
The model predicts that the highest individual involvement in socio-political activities 
can be achieved (in steady-state) if social groups are equally present in the economy 
(specifically, in production12); as the relative importance of any group exceeds the 
egalitarian distribution, time allocated to social participation decreases and time for 
education rises, for individuals of both groups, ceteris paribus the other parameters of 
the model. 
 
 
4. The model simulation 
The model has been simulated for three European countries: Finland, Germany and 
Italy. The choice has been determined by the need to compare countries with different 
female-to-male employment ratios, and also unlike population growth rates (and fertility 
rates, although it is not of our interest) and capital shares. Finland is the European 
country, out of the ex 15-EU, with the highest percentage of women in employment 
relative to men; it is second, after Estonia, if we consider the recently constituted 27-EU 
(see Table 1). On the other hand, Italy performs among the last countries in terms of 
female relative presence in market activities, with a male-to-female employment ratio 
second only to Malta (dead heat with Greece). Germany is performing in between. 
                                                          
12 Alike the Lucas (1988) model, we do not have unemployment. All individuals work.  
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Unsurprisingly, for economists studying the relationship between female labour market 
participation and fertility, Finland is also performing the highest fertility13 and 
population growth rates in the European Union, despite the high proportion of women 
in employment. Italy, on the other hand, is the country with the lowest rate. 
 
Table 1. Simulations’ parameters 
Country Male-to-female employment ratio () Population growth rate (n) 
Capital share 
() 
Finland 1.10826 0.0021 0.418 
Germany 1.1969 0.0006 0.367 
Italy 1.7153 0.0005 0.408 
Source: see Section 2. Finland and Italy: data refer to year 2000. Germany: data refer to year 2005. 
 
As to the parameter on capital share14, Germany presents the lowest proportion of 
income distributed to capital, followed by Italy. The remaining parameters have been set 
at levels normally used in growth models’ simulations15.  
In Table 2 we report the simulations’ results. Simulations confirm our theoretical 
model’s predictions: Finland, the country with the highest proportion of female to male 
employment, converges to a steady state where time allocated to education is higher and 
working time is lower than in all other countries. Moreover, socio-political commitment 
is more than in Germany and Italy. That result supports the empirical evidence 
previously discussed and provides a validation of the theoretical framework, whose 
predictions where uncertain as to the relationship between female relative presence in 
the labour market and time dedicated to socio-political activities. 
Italy and Germany perform as expected due to their parameters. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Do notice that we deal with a closed-economy model; then, our population growth depends on fertility 
and not on migration. However, since the “simulated” countries are not autarkic, in simulating our 
population growth parameter includes migration.  
14 Data are from Sturgill (2009). 
15 Following Ladròn-de-Guevera et al. (1997); time preference (parameter ) has been assumed equal to 
0.05; productivity in the human capital sector has been valued: 0.0769. 
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Table 2. Simulations’ results 
 Finland Germany Italy 
k/h  17.3788 11.5381 16.7547 
c/k 0.131764 0.151254 0.135475 
u* 0.622887 0.642393 0.643693 
p* 0.244015 0.236573 0.235984 
e* 0.133099 0.121034 0.120323 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this article we provide a theoretic framework to explain the relationship, observed in the 
European Union, among relative presence of women in the labour market, educational 
levels and average time allocated to either work or socio-political activities. The 
considered economy is composed by two social groups, women and men, pursuing 
different social values; in this context, individual’s utility depends also on the extent the 
society represents the values of the social group individuals belong to. Values can be 
affirmed by participating in socio-political activities and depending on the relative weight 
of the reference group in the labour market.  
The model predicts that, in stationary state, as the relative importance of any group 
approaches the egalitarian distribution, time devoted to socio-political activities rises, 
whereas time for education decreases. This fact represents a possible explanation for the 
negative relationship between per-capita GDP and female participation observed in the 
data. Nonetheless, simulations show that countries may compensate the negative effect 
on education through an increase in population growth. Indeed, an increase in the rate of 
population growth causes a reduction in time devoted to work and consequently an  
increase in educational attainments. 
Simulations confirm our theoretical model’s predictions: the country with the highest 
proportion of female to male employment and the highest population growth rate 
converges to a steady state where time allocated to education is higher and working time 
is lower than in countries with lower female-to-male employment ratios. Moreover, 
average socio-political commitment is higher the more equally distributed is 
employment between the two genders. That results support the empirical evidence.
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Appendix 
 
Transitional dynamics 
Here, we briefly examine the transitional dynamics of the economy. We must reduce the 
number of state variables by considering the following ratios: 
h
kx   and 
k
cq  . 
 
By deriving x and q with respect to time and considering equation (7), together with 
appropriate endpoint conditions, we obtain the following dynamic system: 
)1(11 puBqxu
x
x  

  
npuBpB
u
u

1)1()1( 

 
qxu
q
q  

  11)1(  
 
It is easy to see that the eigenvalues of this system are always less than 1 and do not 
depend on time devoted to social participation; then, for a given value of p, these three 
variables asymptotically converge to their stationary values. At the same time, u* does 
not depend on p*, therefore the fraction of time devoted to socio-political participation 
will be univocally determined as well as x* and q*.  
Below, we provide the simulations, for Italy, Germany and Finland respectively. 
 
 
Figure A1. Transition path for Italy 
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Figure A2. Transition path for Germany 
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Figure A3. Transition path for Finland 
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Stability analysis. The response of the economy to shocks on physical capital 
Assume the economy is at the steady-state equilibrium *}*,,
*
*,
*
*{ pu
h
k
k
c , following 
Ladrón-de-Guevara et al. (1997), we study the behavior of our economic variables by 
considering a small, positive shock on physical capital.  
 
Time devoted to socio-political participation 
When k increases time devoted to social participation cannot decrease, while u cannot 
increase.  
From (14), we have that npBpuB  *)1(*)*1( , that is, 
npB  *)1( . Now, considering (13), we have ])
*
**([* 11   
k
hunBBp , 
and then 0
*
* 

k
p .  
The above dynamic system implies that, during the transition process, an increase in p 
causes a decrease in u, while the effect on education is ambiguous.  
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Consumption 
Immediately after the shock, consumption jumps up and subsequently decreases.  
If an increase in k causes an increase in p, through equation (12) we can conclude that c 
increases as well.  Nonetheless, as shown in Ladrón-de-Guevara et al. (1997), the 
following equation must hold 
1
1
2
1
1 





 h
k
k
k
 
Thus, 
1
1
1 
 
 k
k
 
Given (7), the elasticity of consumption with respect to physical capital is 1

c
k
k
c . 
Now, since (10) states that an increase in k leads to 01 
 , we will have 0c . 
 
Physical and human capital 
After a positive shock, k will decrease, while the effect on human capital is ambiguous.  
We can show this result by using a contradictory argument. As shown in Caballé and 
Santos (1993) 1

c
k
k
c  only if 01 

h
 . Now, let us assume that k increases along the 
transition path, therefore we will have 01 

k
 , but since 01 
 , this will imply 
01 

h
 . This result contradicts the fact that the elasticity of consumption with respect 
to physical capital is less than 1. 
Human capital may go up or down, it depends on the values of parameters.  
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